

## Section 1: An Outline

Perhaps all philosophy seeks to do is assure us of our choices. It is inevitable that we must take action, but there is infinite action we can take, infinite counterfactuals. This perhaps does far more than merely plan the seed of doubt; perhaps by now it has grown into a gaping chasm that opens periodically with such intensity it forms a vacuum that pulls into its depths all those philosophically inclined to bring upon them suffering and pressure to harden them, their being, into a more valuable substance, while those above who apparently immune to the pull continue grazing upon the prosperity of the time—or not depending on circumstances.

Perhaps these poor tormented philosophers would like the herd immunity they individually lack. Perhaps they enjoy their perceived virtue. Perhaps each person believes their suffering is unique and lets them think they have been allowed to be pulled in by the Chasm, when really they have merely adopted the thought of one who has been down there—having themselves merely gazed upon the depths from where the ideas drifted up from like a diamond making its way to the surface. “Behold! I have found this diamond that has been crafted under great strain. By virtue of holding it, I too understand the strain it underwent!”

But some do truly grapple with the elements and play alchemist to solve primordial questions in the Chasm. I am not one of them. I could not sustain the heat and pressure of true inquiry and have returned with a half-baked lattice. I still cling onto the idea of unity and good and God, ideas not of my own making but trusted upon. One could feel these melting off as one approaches the depths, but I return with these merely damaged and polished—perhaps bound to me even more properly than the previous loose chains. But, freed from shackles and now with molten skin hardened into an armor that allows me to play in the shallow part of the Chasm, I think that I have returned with the base question of philosophy: What should we do?

That is to say, we make decisions, and we know not how or why nor which ones we ought to make. Logically, there are two possibilities: Some actions are “better” than others, or all actions are equal. To discover what is the case, we can work backwards from the decision: There are three possibilities as to how we make decisions: Either they all are predetermined, they all are random, or they all are based on some objective. There is truly not much difference, from our perspective, from predetermined and random as we cannot predict the future terribly accurately and both involve a lack of “free will”.

What exactly is free will, if we were to have it? Is it some metaphysical force with some true “us” that points us towards what we are? Is the metaphysical us, free from physics, able to

make choices in some unbound fashion we cannot fathom, from purely will—some unifying will? Free will is to assume a metaphysical realm detached from our own able to interact with our physical world, and yet we seemingly are unable to interact back with the metaphysical—although the spiritual might think otherwise.

In any case, in this day and age we try to be empirical. Empiricism will be argued for later on, but, for now—to amuse me, take it as a given. The whole concept of “free will” only exists because, well, we experience it. We have evidence pointing towards the existence of free will, and as will be examined, there are no compelling cases against the experience of free will. If we were merely predetermined, it is hard to say what we are. Why do we feel like we make choices if all the choices were made for us? If they were, the Chasm would not be open. There would be no suffering, just blissful experience. This is not to say some of our actions are not predetermined and beyond our control, but, rather, we have evidence that some are directly in our control. Thus, not all of our actions are predetermined.

However, what if it was a nice mixture of predetermined and random? The idea that some of our actions are random still relies on a metaphysical component for randomness, but, instead of stemming from some metaphysical version of us, it comes from some uncomprehensible process that creates random results. Frankly, it matters not much if our actions are random or stem from freewill, but, if they were random, we would think we would die rather quickly. One could say it is a constrained randomness, but it does not quite explain our experience of decision making.

Given that not all our actions are predetermined or random, some must be based on an objective that weighs decisions—choices are made in a coherent manner. Then the old question is replaced by multiple new ones: What is the objective? What decides the objective?

We can assume, humbly, that each person has an objective. We have no particular reason to assume everyone’s objective is the same. Assuming this, then we can say each objective is metaphysically unique to each person. This objective decides our desires. With those desires, we weigh decisions and take actions. (Even if desires are random, the following framework is sound and meaningful.) This is to say, we cannot make decisions without our desires. They are that which we weigh different choices on.

However, how do we know if one desire is better than another desire or another’s desire? Can we say our individual objective is better than someone else’s? We cannot, thus we cannot justify our desire at the expense of someone else’s outright. All of our desires are equally arbitrary with no claim to moral superiority thus far. Thus, there is a fundamental equality of souls, no one being worth more than another.

Collectively, we all simply want to pursue our desires, but, in the state of nature, we fear one another and lack the proper resources to pursue desires alone. Thus, through empiricism, liberal government has been found to be the best solution to allowing for an individual to pursue desire. No one can justify killing another for one's own desire as it runs afoul of another's desire to live. Given all we can do is pursue our desires as they are what allow us to take action, we should design a system that allows one to do so. The liberal system of government is the best solution known—philosophically it can be derived from the equality of souls. However, the desires we are allowed to pursue are constrained by the system.

Thus, the existential question of if some actions are better than others can be answered: As we all want to pursue desires, those actions that are in line with the system are better than those that are not. Traditionally, those actions that are better are simply called good actions—the moral implications will be drawn out fully.

But this leaves some still in existential dread. Essentially, we, our metaphysical selves, pick our desires. This still seems arbitrary and meaningless, until one realizes that we have established some actions are better than others. We must take actions no matter what, so simply take the ones that are better. Going further down the in the Chasm, we see we are merely following our true metaphysical essence. Doing anything else would be betraying our very selves. Going even further, given the existence of better actions, there must be a sorting objective of “good” that might even point towards a divine indistinguishable from the good that we can align ourselves with.

## Section 2: Empiricism

Simply put, there are two epistemologies: Rationalism and its branches versus empiricism and its branches. Rationalism derives its knowledge from thinking about how the world ought to be. Empiricism observes the world and tries to make sense of it.

Formally put, we seek to solve inverse probability problems. Philosophers phrase it as either knowing the criterion for knowledge and then getting knowledge or already having knowledge and deriving the criterion. The mathematicians put it better: There are things that create data—the Kantians called this the thing-in-itself. The rationalists think we can formulate what the thing-in-itself ought to be and from that categorize data as it comes. For example, a certain political party will interpret events differently based on its framework that it believes in. Opposing this are the empiricists that say the inverse probability is impossible to solve certainly. Rather, our understanding of the data generation process is contingent on the data given to us. With the data, we can do our best using empirical tools (e.g. statistics) to estimate the thing-in-itself. However, if the data changes, our understanding of the thing changes. We must always be willing to accept a new reality based on the data presented.

This is to say, the rationalists ranging from Plato to Descartes and beyond are dogmatic in their beliefs. Evidence will not change how they think. Rather, they will change the reality of the evidence to fit their preconceived conception of the thing giving them that data.

We must ask, how do the rationalists go about their enterprise? Where does the necessary knowledge to think of the thing-in-itself come from if not from the data it gives us? Why after a point stop observing the thing, conceptualize it, and then categorize the further data? Some like Kant claim to have access to an a priori faculty. What separates a priori knowledge from posteriori? Do we not know the validity of logic only by experiencing it? How is it we can detach from our worldly selves to think as a God might looking down at his creation to understand things? Assumptions doubtlessly are made, and these golden plaques are clung onto fanatically by their inscribers who act like they were bestowed upon them and cannot be challenged.

The rationalists think they can only be proven wrong in the realm of theory and that all new evidence that might contradict them can be explained away. This is most prominently seen in the Marxists of a day, Marx most clearly being in the rationalist tradition.

The empiricists are more conservative like Burke. They are sometime willing to make an educated leap, but they will not dogmatically die on a hill. They simply move on to what actually works. Empiricism, historically, came to prominence only in Britain, the mainland being dominated by rationalism. It is no surprise then that it was Britain where liberalism, a

most empirical endeavor, came to flourish, while rationalistic absolute monarchism or religious fundamentalism or legalism or other uniformed authoritarian systems rose elsewhere.

### Section 3: Free will and Empiricism

The educated of our time think it in fashion to pretend like we cannot make choices, contrary to our experience. This largely stems from scientific determinism.

“Duplicity!” one may shout. “Science certainly is an empirical philosophy.”

Does science come from empiricism? Yes. Is it a pragmatic tool? Yes. Is science an epistemology? No. Science is a method to make models. In modeling, one must make assumptions, for how else are we to understand something as complex as reality? When dealing with physics, it is *assumed* that the world is merely atoms and the void. It is a necessary simplification. The data it deals with involves our sense perceptions. It ignores our internal data of the experience of free will. There is no particular criterion we have to say our sense perception ought to be weighed greater than our internal perception. For instance, the social sciences do not ignore such data but ignore much of the data physics deals with. Both make accurate predictions of the world roughly speaking in the domains they deal with. Some say that our self-perceptions are an illusion, but, once again, why is it our self-perceptions that have no intermediate layer (our senses) for distortion to be trusted less than the data impressed upon us?

Thus, physics merely assumes that we do not have free will for the sake of simplicity. This is not to say the physical world does not affect us, but it is to merely say we can affect it back through our decisions that are made through some sort of free will.

The scientific determinist, therefore, makes a great folly. They argue, because all of science (physics, chemistry, and such) can be explained without reference to our internal perceptions, then those perceptions must not exist. Obviously, a system designed to systematically ignore those perceptions will conclude this. It is as if they design a belief system with an axiom, and then act like the axiom is something their system discovered.

#### Section 4: On the Good: Part 1: Ockamic System

There is an interesting concept in the history of philosophy called the good. Doing good things makes one moral. The moral person is high in status. What is good obviously changes from society to society and the status game with it. However, philosophers since their dawn have argued for a universal good that anyone can discover. It is the best good, a true good. Most interestingly, even Ockham, who argued against the realism of his day that proposed universal a priori ideas that bind us, argued for an objective good (that will be derived below). Even the empiricists believe in a good, although one would be intrigued to know what evidence led them all to believe in it. Although maybe it is not surprising as nearly all philosophers for all of history believe in this unifying good—and if one does not then one believes in power which speaks more to the philosopher more than anything.

It is so interesting that they all propose an objective good and yet none can agree on what it is or even the nature of what they are trying to discover. What exactly is the benefit of an action being blessed by “good”? That an action is “meaningful”? What does that mean? That an action is objective? Why does that objective in particular matter? I think the only thing one can get all the moralists to agree upon is that a good action is the best action by some objective or criteria. I think the moralists really want some authority to tell them what is best. That is what they long for: To be led. They do not want the accountability of having to pick their own choices—we will see later when examining desire that this, instead of something to cause existential dread, is the greatest liberation. The utilitarians took this the farthest and tried to use their calculus to mathematically calculate the best action. Of course, the ultimate embodiment of this desire to be led is the creation of God who is synonymous with the good.

I will do something horrible to the moralists: I will provide a morality with no authority! We return to the idea that we cannot but follow our desires. We want to follow our desires, and thus we will. This is completely contingent on us and our own will. It is us choosing to follow our desires. Not the authority of anyone else. Thus, what is best by our own decision is to follow our desires. Thus, the best way to pursue our desires is what is moral. We cannot claim to have any authority over anyone else. We cannot claim our best is better than their best. We have a plethora of equal moralities.

Or do we? As stated, we want the best way to pursue our desires. We admit that our desires can be trimmed and cultivated. Society does this by pointing us towards its “good” desires. However, we know all desires are equally arbitrary. It matters not which one we hold, as long as we can pursue it. Thus, in reality, we do not necessarily want the best way to pursue our desires, we want the best way to pursue desire—desire that can be trimmed and cultivated.

Thus, above our subjective ethics, there does lay a universal ethic that is the best for everyone to follow. The exact rules of it can be derived from noting the equality of everyone's authority to pursue desire—not the equality of everyone's desires as some may interfere with the ability of others to pursue desire. Thus, we want a fair system, a reciprocal system.

As a passing thought: The subjective ethics comes from us—it is us essentially. Where does the objective for the universal ethic lay?

## Section 5: On Desire: Part 1: Desire as the Only Choice

It was previously said a decision can either be predetermined, random, or based on an objective. The first two need no explanation, but can we not choose something without an objective? Do we not just choose things all the time without rational? That would be to propose we choose something at random. Either you choose something based on something or not based on something, or one does not choose at all. These are the three options.

We, the ego, choose things based on desire and some desires lead to some desires, but there must be some first intrinsic objective to initially select between desires. This is the purest essence of ourselves. Yes, personality, biology, and external information and conditioning affect what we desire, these will be addressed later on. But, if we are to have free will, this essence of ourselves must exist that makes judgements based on all these things based on our intrinsic objective. This personal objective is purely metaphysical and works through the free will.

Thus, one can only follow one's objective that arises to us through desires. There is no alternative. One must pursue their desires. One can desire to choose things based off of some rational they think have authority, but it truly is all hevel.

But, there is nothing more liberating to following one's desires. It is to be one's truest self, to be a free spirit. We need not another to tell us what our objective is. It is merely us. We need no authority to tell us it is right to desire and want to fulfill our desires.

## Section 6: On Duty: Part 1: On the Non-Existence of Duty

Philosophers are the creators of all words. Particular words hold within them entire philosophic systems that are completely oblivious to the user. This will be explored in much depth later on. However, one such is duty. There is the Greek sense of the word. There is the Roman sense; the Christian sense; the Stoic sense; the Confucian sense; the Kantian sense. One invokes the word with the entire philosophic system of some long dead philosopher imbued into the user unknowingly.

Say, hypothetically, we believe the liberal state is the best state for allowing us to pursue desires. It can be said that we now have duties to the state. But now, however, we have a terrible problem. Those of lesser virtue refer to this problem at “work-life” balance. We are concerned, rather, with the duty-desire problem:

Given our system, we owe everything to the state. We cannot pursue desire without first having secured the state. But, in this world of complexity and randomness, how do we know if we have sacrificed enough? Surely everything is too much as then the state is not worth it. Surely nothing is not enough, but what is a suitable compromise? How are we to know how hard our adversaries are working to ruin everything we have built? How can we justify pursuing more desire than we ought to and fail in our duties?

There is a two-part solution to this problem of enslavement to the state:

First, one must realize that duty does not exist. It is a semantics game that obscures things.

Take for instance, any desire. All desires have prerequisites and requirements to them. One may desire that this is not the case, but this is a dumb desire, frankly. One may not particularly enjoy meeting these prerequisites and requirements, but the rational animal—us occasionally—is able delay gratification in pursuit of higher goals (desires). So “duty” in actuality is merely the prerequisites to pursuing other desires.

The second part of the solution is organizational.

First, why do anything if it does not eventually lead to desire fulfillment? One, in my society, does not learn how to properly read poetry to get a date. Men are not motivated to do this. Instead, working out leads to success, so we workout—or is merely one of the reasons we workout. This is the idea of a status game, where one wins status based on the rules of an institution.

We each individually do not know how to run a state. It is far too complicated. Thus, it is impossible for us to know how much sacrifice is needed to run a state. Thus, the solution to our problem is to have feedback mechanisms and experts in the state to tell us how much sacrifice is needed in a direction. This is done in part through the economy. Anything

handled by the economy we do not have a duty to do. We do not have a duty to manage the central bank because the economy found people willing to do it. We do not have a duty to conserve nature because the government, after being told by the people it is a problem, has hired people to do it. One can help with conservation or anything the government does out of desire or to chase status if that thing rewards status—status enabling the pursuit of different desires, but the need has been met by the calculations of those in the know & compromise and the economy, ideally. The US has done so well as to have an all-volunteer military. Duties, on the other hand, arise when the government and market do not properly handle something. In the early days of conservation, the government did not handle it well. The people lack the information as to how much one needs to sacrifice to help the environment, so environmental lobbyists won over the government to begin handling that issue.

Why do this though? If one does not have a desire to do so, why bring this to the attention of the government? One can make a science-based argument for protecting the environment, but, in this framework of desire-fulfillment, we will focus on status. In a properly functioning state—or rather if it is not absolute hell, the state and society reward status to those that bring problems to the attention of the state. This status allows one to pursue desires.

If doing duties brings status upon us, how do we know we have made enough sacrifices to justify pursuing a desire? As long as the state and market are running well, when one is able to properly pursue a desire, enough has been sacrificed. This is to say, don't reward people stupidly. If someone is rich that you think does not deserve it like an online influencer, then per chance society is stupidly rewarding people.

Generally, a combination of status, money, and skills allow desire fulfillment, and the creation of all three benefits the state. Once you have earned enough of the three for your desire, the state has deemed you have sacrificed enough—and will tax you enough to manage those duties that state has adopted.

## Section 7: The Hunt for the Divine: Part 1: Breadcrumbs

Having established that we are metaphysical beings and that the objective lies in the realm of metaphysics, we need to understand this realm better to understand ourselves better.

We can start by asking, simply, what is the correct level of analysis? Are we whole? Or are we simply many parts? Is that chair whole? Or is it simply many parts? Why do we see things the way we see them with parts, sections, in entirety? This is to ask, is there any corresponding objectiveness to how we see things? Does there exist any level of analysis without us besides atoms and the void?

Further, say we have discovered an object, a whole thing: A further problem is there are infinite different ways to categorize it from its history, taxonomy, utility, and so on. Is there an objective way of categorization or is it merely up to us to decide?

On the assumption that we exist, we can progress. But what does it mean to exist? Are there not different kinds of existence? Are there not things that exist only because of the presence of perceptions and things that exist in spite of them not being perceived. But if a thing can exist without our perception, there then must be a fundamental unity to the thing, one inherent in it—an inherent level of analysis. This thing that can exist on its own is a *being*. We give this status to ourselves. We exist as beings, individuals, with or without being noticed.

On the other hand, a chair is a thing of utility. We have no reason to suppose that the idea of a chair can exist without humans as it is entirely a creation of our own mind. It has a conceptualizable existence in the sense that we can conceive it and then grant it an embodied existence, but it can never be an embodied being like we are. It has been established that we have a metaphysical existence connected to our physical embodiment. There is no reason to suppose that of a chair.

But a fourth category is much more intriguing, what of the conceptualizable beings? Those with no embodiment? It is known that the physical universe has a starting point in time. It is illogical that time would not have a beginning just as it is illogical for there not have been a first cause. Conceptualizable things are not dependent on time as they are not tied down to the physical world. A thing of conceptualizable existence always has the potential to be thought of. A conceptualizable being is something simply inherent. It cannot not be. It is objective. It has always been there and will always be there regardless of if there is a physical universe and regardless of if anyone knows it is there.

We know from our embodied being that the metaphysical can interact with the physical, so possibly a conceptualizable being has done the same.

## Section 8: On the Good: Part 2: The Good as Objective

It was spoken of earlier how the good arises as a unifying concept from each of our subjective meanings. It is the thing that is best for each of us to do. But what exactly is it?

This is obviously not finished. I know what I want to say, but I simply do not have the time at the moment and find my other studies of more immediate impact and concern.